There is no widely accepted definition of price discrimination with differentiated products. Either absolute price-cost differences or percentage price-cost markups are used as benchmarks for comparison. I show that the two criteria are qualitatively different: one may indicate price discrimination when the other does not. Moreover, anything other than marginal cost pricing will be identified as price discrimination by at least one of the two. I propose choosing a criterion based on the cost of arbitrage in the market under examination. Because this is often difficult to determine, I also recommend always reporting results with both measures.
Introduction
Price discrimination is said to exist when the same product is sold to different consumers at different prices. Most economists also agree that price discrimination is at work when similar -but not identical -products are sold at prices that do not reflect differences in costs. Economics textbooks are rife with examples such as student or senior citizen discounts, coupons, nonuniform pricing across geographically segmented markets, hardcover and paperback versions of books, dinner versus lunch prices at restaurants, air fares with various restrictions, and price spreads of retail gasoline products.
Some economists have criticized the identification of such apparent "price anomalies" as price discrimination. For example, Lott and Roberts (1991) argued that there are usually cost-based explanations for these phenomena. They proposed such explanations for the cases of air fare, gasoline, and restaurant prices. Nevertheless, the authors do not challenge the conventional wisdom that price differences that can not be explained by cost differences are discriminatory.
In recent years a number of papers have set out to empirically assess instances of alleged price discrimination. The literature goes to great lengths to control for potential sources of cost variation among different products and thus -to the extent that it is successful -is not subject to the Lott-Roberts critique. Almost all studies conclude that price discrimination is practiced in the particular market they analyze. A skeptic, of course, could always argue that some sources of cost variation have not been accounted for and thus dismiss the results as erroneous.
Despite the mild controversy over the methodology and its effectiveness, the basic premise seems universally accepted: the existence of price variation that can not be explained by cost differences constitutes price discrimination. This is not, however, a formal definition. In fact there is no single, widely accepted definition of price discrimination with differentiated products. Some authors define price discrimination to exist when price-cost margins (absolute differences) between differentiated products are unequal, while others prefer to compare price-cost markups (percentage differences). Few authors have discussed the relative merits of one measure over the other.
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The relationship between the two has never been spelled out and the choice among them remains arbitrary.
In this paper I aim to shed some light on this issue and provide some guidelines to empirical researchers interested in price discrimination. In section 2 I provide an overview of the current state of the literature. I introduce the two competing definitions of price discrimination and briefly discuss the justification that has been provided for each. I then review the empirical literature that uses one or the other definition as the basis of testing for price discrimination. I present the basic methodology and discuss the definitional choices made by researchers investigating different market environments. The picture that emerges from this overview is murky and provides little guidance to the empirical practitioner.
A brief exchange between Kahana and Spiegel (1988) and Liebowitz (1988) was limited in scope as it preceded the recent empirical literature.
The absence of controversy on the choice of definition might simply reflect the fact that the two commonly used definitions are equivalent. In section 3 I show that this is not the case. Specifically, it is possible for one definition to indicate the presence of price discrimination and for the other one to reject it. It is also possible for the two measures to take opposite signs; that is, one product may have a higher markup and a lower margin. I also show that, in general, the margin criterion is more likely to indicate the presence of price discrimination. I conclude that the choice of definition has important implications and should not be taken lightly.
The challenge is to come up with a consistent way of thinking about price discrimination that can easily be applied in a variety of settings. In section 4 I argue that pricing policies should be designated as discriminatory if they can not be sustained in the presence of arbitrage. This implies that the cost of engaging in arbitrage should determine whether margins, markups, or some other metric is the right way to assess discrimination. If the cost of arbitrage is a fixed per-unit cost, nondiscriminatory prices will feature equal margins. If the cost of arbitrage depends on product characteristics, then markups will be equal. If both components are important, neither metric is sufficient. In all cases it is a good idea to report results using both measures as a simple robustness check.
Theoretical definitions and empirical tests
This section provides an overview of the current state of the literature. It starts with a discussion of two theoretical definitions of price discrimination. It then outlines the empirical methodology that has been used to test for price discrimination, highlighting its link to the theoretical definitions. The review of the empirical literature that follows reveals no systematic pattern of usage for the competing definitions.
Definitions
Consider the examples of airfare and books. The price of first-class passenger service is much higher than that of economy service; similarly, hardcover books are typically priced at more than twice the price of their paperback versions. The cost of providing the two different products in each example is not the same, yet the additional cost associated with the higher quality product appears to be very small compared to the premium the consumer has to pay for it. This is the basic premise of the general notion of price discrimination.
In order to formulate this idea into a rigorous definition one needs to be precise about what it means for price differences to not be explained by cost differences. Should price differences reflect cost differences one-to-one in order to be considered nondiscriminatory? Or should prices deviate from costs by a fixed percentage? Formally, suppose that two varieties of a certain good are sold at prices p 1 and p 2 and marginal costs of production are equal to c 1 and c 2 . The first definition requires that cost differences be reflected in price differences one-to-one:
Definition 1 (Margin definition)
Price discrimination occurs whenever price-cost margins of two (or more) varieties of the same good are not the same; that is, whenever p 2 − c 2 = p 1 − c 1 . Phlips (1983) is the foremost advocate of this definition. He goes through a fairly lengthy explanation of his position, but he never directly compares this definition with the next one. Notable authors like Tirole (1988) and Norman (1999) have adopted the margin definition in their treatments of price discrimination. Stigler (1987) , on the other hand, proposed a different definition:
Definition 2 (Markup definition)
Price discrimination occurs whenever price-cost markups of two varieties of the same good are not the same; that is, whenever p 2 /c 2 = p 1 /c 1 (or, equivalently, whenever ln p 2 − ln c 2 = ln p 1 − ln c 1 ). Varian (1989) and Stole (2001) adopted the markup definition. It also seems to be the definition that Machlup (1952) had in mind, although he did not state it formally. Stigler justifies his preference for it as follows:
The proportionality definition has the merit of separating a monopolist's behavior into two parts: (1) the simple restriction of output such that price is greater than marginal cost; and (2) the misallocation of the two or more goods among buyers when they are charged different prices, which is zero if prices are proportional to marginal costs. (Stigler 1987, page 210.) Margins can demonstrate the output restriction as well as markups do, but they do not capture the misallocation aspect. It is easy to see how misallocation arises when consumers demand multiple units of a homogeneous good.
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It is less clear how that works when consumers have unit demands for differentiated products. This distinction will be shown to be important in section 4. It is also worth noting that comparing the markups of two products is equivalent to comparing their respective Lerner indices: a higher markup implies a higher Lerner index.
3
This may give some appeal to the markup definition since the Lerner index is a well-known quantity that is often used as a measure of market power.
These observations are useful, but they do not appear powerful enough to settle the issue. In fact, many of the authors cited above have stressed the difficulty of coming up with a precise and comprehensive definition. The premise of this paper is that,
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The marginal price of the last unit paid by a buyer of large quantities may be lower than what a buyer of a small quantity is willing to pay for an additional unit.
Some indicative quotations: Machlup (1952) says that "comprehensive definitions of price discrimination will always be clumsy" (p. 136); Phlips (1983) notes that "the more one thinks of price discrimination, the harder it is to define" (p. 5); Tirole (1988) states that "it is difficult to offer an all-encompassing definition" (p. 134).
despite the nebulous nature of the issue, we should at least be aware of the general relationship between the two definitions and the different implications they may have in specific settings.
The rest of this section outlines the basic methodology used to test for price discrimination and reviews some of the empirical studies. A word on terminology is in order. Stole (2001) points out that economists' notion of price discrimination has diverged from Pigou's (1920) traditional taxonomy of first, second and third degree price discrimination. Even though Pigou's terminology has been retained, the classification given in most textbooks today is different from what he had suggested. To avoid any confusion I will follow Stole (2001) in classifying price discrimination techniques as direct versus indirect. Direct price discrimination (third degree price discrimination in Pigou's classification) is exercised on the basis of observable characteristics such as age, gender, and location. Indirect price discrimination (which was not really considered by Pigou) sorts consumers by offering menus of products that differ in quality or quantity. The crucial distinction is that when discrimination is direct each consumer is offered only one product; with indirect discrimination consumers have a choice among the available products.
Empirical tests
The most direct way to test for price discrimination is to use information on the prices different consumers pay for the same good.
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Since such detailed data are usually not available, researchers have had to infer discriminatory practices from price observations in different markets. Inference is based on a simple and intuitive econometric methodology that tests for price discrimination on the basis of one of the two definitions presented above. I describe a basic version of this methodology below while noting that different variants of it have been employed.
Consider the case of two products, indexed by 1 and 2. Typically this pair of products is observed in a number of different markets. Available data are {p ij , x ij ; i = 1, 2; j = 1, . . . , J}, where p ij denotes price, x ij is a vector of observed cost shifters and i and j index products and markets respectively. Suppose that the researcher has decided to test for price discrimination by comparing markups. Nondiscriminatory pricing under the markup definition implies that the difference in log-prices must be equal to the difference in log-costs; that is, ln p 2 − ln p 1 = ln c 2 − ln c 1 . If marginal costs are observed, then all one has to do is compute the markups and compare them. But costs are usually not observed. The solution is to specify cost econometrically as a function of observed product characteristics and estimate it. For i = 1, 2, let ln c i = x i β + ω i , where ω i is a unobserved cost shifter. If there is no price discrimination, ln p 2 − ln p 1 = ln c 2 − ln c 1 = (x 2 β +ω 2 )−(x 1 β +ω 1 ) = (x 2 −x 1 ) β +ε, where ε = ω 2 −ω 1 . Letting ∆ denote differences, the corresponding regression equation is:
The test for price discrimination amounts to a statistical test of the null hypothesis α = 0. Failure to reject the hypothesis means that price differences are fully explained by cost 5 See, for example, Goldberg (1996) . differences and there is no price discrimination. Rejection of the hypothesis indicates that demand differences induce price differences and thus price discrimination is said to exist.
The same idea can be applied to the margin definition. Nondiscrimination requires that absolute price differences be equal to absolute cost differences:
The regression equation is :
A comparison of equations (1) and (2) reveals the empirical analogue of the markup versus margin dilemma. Adopting a definition of price discrimination is equivalent to deciding whether to use differences in prices or differences in log-prices as the dependent variable in the regression. Either way, it is important to control for all possible variation in cost. Any cost variation that is not accounted for will be captured in the constant α which will falsely indicate the presence of price discrimination. The prime challenge for empirical researchers is to come up with ways of controlling for cost differences.
Two pioneering studies of gasoline pricing showed the way. Borenstein (1991) exploits the varying availability of leaded and unleaded gasoline in order to test for price discrimination. He finds that margins for leaded gasoline are higher, a result that is consistent with the fact that competition is less strong in that market. The author justifies his use of margins on industry conventions. He also argues that the margin is a better indicator of market power in his example because market power derives from the buyer's transportation cost of switching dealers. Discrimination in Borenstein's study is direct (third-degree) because it is based on an observable characteristic, the car's engine type. Shepard (1991) compares gas prices at stations with both full-service and self-service pumps (multi-product stations) versus those that offer only one of the two options (singleproduct stations). Her theoretical model predicts that in a competitive market margins should be the same in all stations, while in the presence of market power margins will differ between full-service and self-service stations. The intuition is the following. Assume that the cost of selling gasoline in a multi-product station is the same as the cost of doing so in a single-product station. Then when there is no price discrimination the price of each type of gasoline should be the same regardless of station type. She finds that this is not the case. The price of full-service gasoline is higher in multi-product stations, while the price of self-service is lower. This implies that multi-product stations are exploiting the presence of two products in order to price discriminate. Discrimination in this example is indirect: consumers have the option of going to any station and they sort themselves based on location and brand preference.
In another study of indirect price discrimination, Borenstein and Rose (1994) look at variation in fares paid by different passengers on the same flight. The authors prefer using markups on the grounds that "cost-based differences, such as peak-load pricing, hold markups constant." They find that price variation can not be fully explained by cost differences. Verboven (2002) , on the other hand, uses margins to compare gasolineand diesel-fueled automobiles in Europe. He argues that cars with diesel engines can be considered to be of higher quality than autos of similar features running on gasoline because of the lower cost of diesel fuel and its favorable tax treatment. He finds that, as theory would predict, the higher quality product (diesel-engine cars) sells at a higher margin. Clerides (2002) uses actual measures of marginal cost to compare both margins and markups of hardcover and paperback versions of books. He finds that both margins and markups are higher for hardcovers than for paperbacks. In line with corollary 4, his conclusion is stronger when margins are compared.
Two recent papers examine quantity-based indirect discrimination. Cohen (2000) looks at the pricing of different package sizes of paper towels. He uses margins as the benchmark for comparison and finds substantial price dispersion that can not be explained by cost variation. Busse and Rysman (2002) , on the other hand, prefer markups as the relevant measure in their study of yellow pages advertising prices. They find that the price per square inch is lower for larger advertisements, which therefore have lower markups. The authors argue that cost factors can not explain this difference.
Finally, some researchers have looked for price discrimination across geographically distinct markets. Verboven (1996) and Goldberg and Verboven (2001) compare automobile prices across European countries. They adopt markups as the basis of comparison and find substantial variation across countries. Giulietti and Waterson (1997) compare prices of several products across Italian supermarkets. These authors declare themselves to be agnostic on the markup vs. margin issue and use both in their analysis. Both measures indicate the presence of price discrimination.
If any picture emerges from this review, it is one of inconsistency. Most studies do not go to great lengths to justify their choice of definition. They simply select one or the other (or both), citing one or more of the earlier papers in support of their choice. Table 1 summarizes the key aspects of the studies reviewed in this section. The lack of any systematic pattern is apparent. Different measures of price discrimination are used to evaluate pricing policies in seemingly similar situations. This would not be an issue if the two measures were equivalent. In the next section I show that they are not.
3 Do margins and markups tell us the same thing?
The ultimate purpose of the empirical literature is to test the null hypothesis of no price discrimination. If margins and markups always deliver the same verdict on this test, they can be thought of as being qualitatively equivalent. In this section I show that they are not. 
All derivations are relegated to appendix A. I will lay out the main implications of this proposition in a series of corollaries. I start with the simplest case:
The corollary states that the two definitions are qualitatively equivalent when there are no cost differences between the two products, so the choice between them is immaterial. The next corollary deals with the case where cost differences do exist:
Corollary 2 If c 2 = c1, both definitions will reject the presence of price discrimination if and only if price equals marginal cost for both products. This is an important point: anything that is not marginal cost pricing will be identified as price discrimination by at least one of the two definitions. The significance of selecting a definition ex ante and for the right reasons is obvious. Otherwise one could look at the data and pick the definition that delivers the "right" answer. A simple example will help illustrate this point. Consider a firm that monopolizes two markets. The costs of serving those markets are c 1 and c 2 , with c 2 > c 1 . If the firm decides to price at equal margins, the high-priced product will have a lower markup than the cheaper product. If, on the other hand, the firm prices at equal markups, the more expensive product will have a higher margin. Anything the firms does (other than price at marginal cost) will be deemed discriminatory by one of the two definitions. Suppose, further, that the good can be freely transported across markets at zero cost. Then the firm will be forced to set p 2 = p 1 and both margins and markups will differ across markets. Both measures will indicate the presence of price discrimination even though the firm does not have the ability to segment the markets.
For the next two corollaries suppose that, without loss of generality, good 2 is no cheaper than good 1; that is, p 2 ≥ p 1 . Consider first the case c 2 < c 1 . This is not a common occurrence but examples of it have been reported in the literature, notably in the context of "damaged goods". The corollary states that the practice of selling damaged goods is always discriminatory according to both measures. This is in accordance to our intuition; few economists would disagree with the notion that charging a higher price for a good that is less costly to produce is discriminatory.
The most important and empirically relevant scenario is the case c 2 > c 1 :
The term is due to Deneckere and McAfee (1996) ; it refers to situations where firms incur additional cost in order to produce lower quality versions of their main product.
(iv) If p 2 > p 1 then we may have ∆MARGIN > 0 and ∆MARKUP < 0.
The first two statements indicate the ways in which different outcomes can emerge from the two definitions. The third statement states that if c 1 > 1 we can actually rank the two measures: ∆MARGIN will always be at least as high as the ∆MARKUP. This implies that, as long as c 1 > 1, margins are more likely to indicate the presence of price discrimination than markups.
The fourth statement points out that the two quantities could take opposite signs. That is, one product may have a higher margin while the other may have a higher markup. Since neither definition restricts the direction of the inequality, mechanical application of the two criteria will tell us that both find price discrimination. Nonetheless, the direction of price discrimination should be of some interest. Although usually it is not formally stated, price discrimination embodies a notion of someone being discriminated against in the sense of paying more than someone else. If that is the case, what are we to make of situations where our two measures point in opposite directions? Consider an example where p 2 = 12, c 2 = 8, p 1 = 8, c 1 = 5 and therefore ∆MARGIN > 0 and ∆MARKUP < 0. Who is paying more in this case? Although there is no clear-cut answer, I am inclined to go with the principle that whoever pays a higher price is "paying more." After all, how often do people who pay a lower price complain that they are being discriminated against because they pay a higher margin? By that logic, margins are a better indicator of discrimination because the more expensive product will rarely have a lower margin.
The data on hardcover and paperback books from Clerides (2002) provide a useful illustration of the results provided in corollary 4. In Figure 1 , the horizontal axis plots ∆MARGIN and the vertical axis plots ∆MARKUP for the hardcover and paperback versions of 71 books. A book that lies on the horizontal axis and to the right of the vertical axis will have a higher margin for the hardcover version but equal markups. The implications of each statement of corollary 4 can be clearly seen: (i) all titles with nonnegative ∆MARKUP have positive ∆MARGIN; (ii) the five observations in the southwest quadrant have (nearly) equal margins and lower markups for the more expensive product; (iii) all observations are below the diagonal; and (iv) four observations (those in the southeast quadrant) take opposite signs for ∆MARKUP and ∆MARGIN.
In summary, the results from this section indicate that the two definitions will coincide only when the high-price product is no more costly to produce than the low-price product. When this is not the case, the choice of definition is important and should be carefully considered. It is important to note that these conclusions are based solely on algebraic cosniderations. The only economic restriction imposed is that price is above marginal cost. One would like to know what economic conditions, if any, might give rise to each of the cases outlined in corollary 4. For example, visual inspection of equation (3) suggests that ∆MARGIN and ∆MARKUP will diverge when prices deviate substantially from marginal costs and cost differences are high. It is difficult, however, to make general statements. Economic restrictions on possible combinations of margins and markups must be justified by a theoretical model. Any such model would have to be tailored to the particular market under examination and hence its conclusions will be difficult to generalize.
Discrimination and the cost of arbitrage
Identification of price discrimination requires the existence of a nondiscriminatory pricing policy that will serve as a benchmark for comparison. In the case of homogeneous products this benchmark is uniform pricing: when all consumers pay the same price, there is no price discrimination. When products are differentiated, however, there is no obvious pricing policy that serves this purpose. Consider, for example, a monopolist serving two geographically distinct markets that have different demands and the cost of serving each market is different. Or, consider a firm that produces two versions of the same product that differ in quality and production cost. What is the nondiscriminatory pricing policy in those cases? Does such a policy require equal margins, equal markups, or something completely different?
A useful benchmark can be obtained by relaxing the conditions that make discrimination possible. The two most important requirements for price discrimination are the existence of market power and the impossibility of resale. In the homogeneous product case, the difference between the discriminatory and nondiscriminatory policies stems from the impossibility of resale. Market power by itself is not enough to enable the firm to discriminate. It seems reasonable to extend this intuition to the case of differentiated products and designate as nondiscriminatory those policies that survive the introduction of arbitrage. This idea is not new; it underlies many existing treatments of price discrimination.
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The contribution of this paper is to make this interpretation more concrete and show how it can be implemented in empirical work.
The case of quantity discounts illustrates this well. Suppose a product is sold individually at a price of $10 per unit and in packages of two at a price of $15 per package. This pricing policy can not survive the introduction of arbitrage: one can purchase the package, break it up and sell the individual items for a net gain. This threat will force the monopolist to price linearly, at a constant unit price. If the marginal cost of the package is (roughly) twice the cost of a single item, linear pricing implies equal markups but unequal margins (unless price equals marginal cost). Hence markups are the preferred indicator of price discrimination when comparing packages of different sizes.
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Arbitrage works in a straightforward way in this case because a package is just a combination of individual units. When products are physically differentiated, however, arbitrage is no longer a simple matter of resale. One of the products must be somehow transformed into the other in order to be resold. The transformation process may simply 7 See, for example, Phlips (1983) and Tirole (1988) .
The margin criterion will practically always indicate the presence of price discrimination when packages of different size are available. Margins will only be equal when the incremental price of the second unit is equal to marginal cost. This will rarely by the case. Alternatively, one might prefer to compare price per unit across packages: nondiscrimination requires that price per unit not depend on package size. involve transporting the good to a different location, or it may require something more elaborate like upgrading the product. Either way, there is some cost involved in the process. My recommendation is that the form of the arbitrage cost function should determine the nondiscriminatory policy. Broadly speaking, if the cost of arbitrage is a fixed per-unit cost, nondiscrimination requires margin equality. If the cost of arbitrage depends on product characteristics, the requirement is markup equality.
The case of geographic differentiation provides a nice illustration of this point. Consider a car manufacturer selling his product in two countries. If costs vary across countries, what is the nondiscriminatory pricing policy? Suppose that the good is manufactured in country 1, where it is priced at p 1 . It can be transported to country 2 at a cost of t = f + τ p 1 per unit. The freight cost may depend on price for a number of reasons; for example, insurance costs during transportation are a function of the good's value.
In the absence of trade, the firm would be able to set the profit-maximizing price for each market. When arbitrage is possible the two prices can not deviate by more than the freight cost, t. The nondiscriminatory price in country 2 is
If freight cost is fixed (f > 0 and τ = 0), nondiscrimination requires p 2 = p 1 + f . Given that there are no other cost differences, this implies identical margins. If, on the other hand, freight cost is variable (f = 0 and τ > 0), nondiscriminatory pricing requires p 2 = (1 + τ )p 1 , implying identical markups.
As another example, consider the case of vertically differentiated products (quality discrimination). What is the nondiscriminatory pricing policy when a firm sells high and low quality versions of some product? Arbitrage in this case involves purchasing the low quality product, upgrading it to high quality, and reselling it. The analogue to freight cost is the cost of upgrading. If the cost of upgrading is mostly fixed, margins are the better measure of price discrimination. If the cost depends on the value of the good, markups should be preferred. Consider the example of books. Binding a book in hardcover certainly has a variable component: longer books (in terms of number of pages) require more materials. But, as Clerides (2002) notes, most of the cost is that of the cover itself, which is independent of the length of the book. Thus nondiscriminatory pricing of books requires equal margins.
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The argument carries through in exactly the same way when products are horizontally differentiated. A market definition problem may however arise if products are 'too' differentiated. When can two products be considered different varieties of the same good (in which case we can talk about price discrimination) and when are they two completely different goods? Consider, for example, a food establishment that sells pizzas and sandwiches. Suppose that the costs of preparing an individual serving of each are the same 9 This is free-on-board (fob) pricing: consumers are charged a uniform price plus freight cost. Most economists will agree that the fob is nondiscriminatory while freight absorption policies ("free shipping" offers) are discriminatory.
(both items require similar ingredients: flour, tomatoes, cheese, etc.). Should they be priced the same? Is it price discrimination if they are not? I would say the answer to both questions is yes, but it is easy to see how this logic can take us down a slippery path.
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As seen in the two examples, choosing the correct measure requires knowledge of the arbitrage cost function. This may not always be easy. The problem is further confounded when both the fixed and the value-dependent component of arbitrage cost are important: neither metric would be a good indicator of price discrimination. Consider implementation of the methodology described in section 2 using data on prices and characteristics (cost-shifters) of a number of different car models in two countries. In order to test margin equality we can estimate equation (2), where f is parameterized by x β. If arbitrage cost is t = f + τ p 1 , the relationship between the prices in the no discrimination case is p 2 − p 1 = f + (1 + τ )p 1 . Estimation of equation (2) does not control for the (1 + τ )p 1 part. The latter will show up in the constant, incorrectly indicating the presence of price discrimination.
Adding p 1 as an explanatory variable in the regression can correct that problem, but only at the risk of creating a different one. Suppose the arbitrage cost is fixed (t = f ) and the firm is discriminating by charging p 2 − p 1 = f + (1 + )p 1 , > 0. If we run a regression of price differences on cost shifters and p 1 , the coefficient on the latter will capture all residual price variation that is unexplained by cost factors. This will lead us to erroneously conclude that there is no discrimination. The problem is that the coefficient on p 1 is capturing two things. One is price discrimination; the other is the extent to which the cost of arbitrage depends on the value of the good. Without more information, we can not separately identify the two effects.
A different identification problem may arise when demand is unknown. Suppose our car manufacturer monopolizes two countries that have identical demands but one is more costly to serve than the other. Suppose also that we know that the cost of arbitrage is fixed, so that nondiscrimination requires equal margins. Since demand is identical a profit-maximizing (and price-discriminating) firm will set a higher price in the high-cost market. But what are margins going to look like? Unfortunately, there is no single answer; it all depends on the shape of the demand curve. Margins will be higher in the high-cost market if demand is log-linear, they will be lower if demand is linear and they will be equal if demand is exponential. If the latter happens to be the case, we will fail to identify price discrimination.
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This suggests that demand information is an important element in the identification of discriminatory practices.
Where does this all leave us? Exploiting the idea of arbitrage as a way of establishing discriminatory policies is useful in situations where the cost of arbitrage is easy to determine. When this is not possible, assessing pricing policies may require a complete model of consumer demand, firm behavior, and arbitrage activity. In any case, it is good practice to always report results with both measures; they do, after all, contain different 11 I am grateful to Simon Anderson for this example.
It is easy to construct other examples where the opposite is true: we will identify price discrimination when it does not exist. This point has been recognized in the extensive literature on exchange rate pass-through and pricing-to-market; see Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for a survey.
information. If they concur, the researcher can be quite confident of his conclusions. If not, this is something the reader should know about.
Concluding remarks
In this paper I examine the properties of the two commonly used definitions of price discrimination with differentiated products. I show that, unless costs are equal, anything that is not marginal cost pricing will be identified as price discrimination by at least one of the two definitions. Moreover, the two measures are qualitatively different: it is possible for one to accept price discrimination and for the other to reject it.
Clearly, choosing the right definition is important. But how do we choose? Markups are the conservative choice as they are generally less likely to indicate the presence of price discrimination than margins. They are also unit-free and correspond directly to the widely used Lerner index. On the other hand, markups may often be lower for the more expensive product, making interpretation difficult. I propose a more systematic way of thinking about price discrimination in terms of the feasibility of arbitrage. I argue that the form of the arbitrage cost function determines the right measure to use in testing for price discrimination. Given that the cost of arbitrage is not typically observed, empirical implementation of this idea will not always be straightforward. But it can, at the very least, help the researcher sort out the different sources of variation in the data and guide his modeling approach.
Overall, it is important to keep in mind that identification of price discrimination becomes increasingly tenuous as we move away from a world of homogeneous products and equal costs. Despite this caveat, this is a line of research worth pursuing. The analysis of firm strategy and pricing practices is an interesting topic in and of itself. Moreover, the study of pricing is an important source of information about the nature of demand in different industries; firms, after all, set prices in response to consumer preferences. Hopefully this paper has helped clarify some of the issues that often arise in this literature.
where line 1 is the definition; in line 2 we get rid of the parentheses and multiply and divide by c 1 ; in line 3 we add and subtract p 2 /c 2 ; and in line 4 we replace ∆MARKUP = p 2 /c 2 − p 1 /c 1 and reorder terms. It is easy to show that the last four terms in the parentheses can be rewritten as This concludes the proof. 2
Corollary 1: Trivial.
Corollary 2: There are two directions to the statement:
(⇐) Clearly, if p 2 = c 2 and p 1 = c 1 we have ∆M ARGIN = ∆M ARKU P = 0.
(⇒) Suppose both products reject the presence of price discrimination; that is, ∆M ARGIN = ∆M ARKU P = 0. It follows that the second term on the right hand side of equation (3) must also equal zero. Since c 1 = c 2 , it must be that p 2 = c 2 . Given that and the fact that ∆M ARGIN = 0, it must be that p 1 = c 1 . 2
Corollary 3: Trivial.
Corollary 4: Statements (i), (ii) and (iii) follow immediately from the fact that the last term in equation (3) is positive. Statement (iv) follows from statement (ii) by a continuity argument: it is always possible to increase p 2 by a small enough amount so that ∆MARGIN becomes positive while ∆MARKUP remains negative. 
